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I  The Stability and Growth Pact - Deficiencies and Failures 
 
Until very recently the euro, the common currency adopted by 17 of the 27 
European  Union  (EU)  member  states,  was  seen  widely  as  a  possible           
contender to the US dollar in its function as the international reserve 
currency. Some experts even went as far as to predict the date on which 
the US dollar would be overtaken. This optimism was anchored mainly in 
the extraordinary price stability record of the new currency that made it 
more attractive as a unit of account and as a store of value. It needed only 
a single financial crisis to change this perspective.  Even then, the euro is 
not close to moving into a zone of price instability. The real problem the 
euro encounters is the permanent division of the eurozone into a group of      
economies with strong levels of international competitiveness and a group 
of debt-ridden unstable economies with weak  international            
competitiveness. 
 
Such a constellation is not sustainable for a currency union that came about 
without accompanying political integration. When the euro was launched in 
1999, the founders of the common currency assumed it would be sufficient 
to introduce fiscal surveillance institutions that would control and eventually 
guarantee  convergence processes of the member economies. However, 
this assumption was flawed, and reality hit when the financial crisis 
triggered potential sovereign debt crises in the periphery of the eurozone. 
This has highlighted that introducing a supranational currency without 
accompanying political integration is a risky maneuver. The policy-makers 
of the euro were well-alerted early on that the new currency in Europe 
might quickly be compromised by loose national fiscal policies as free-rider 
opportunities come up along the way. In particular, it was the German 
government that cleared the way to introduce the Stability and Growth  Pact   
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(SGP) as a disciplinary institution that should 
guarantee responsible fiscal behavior by member 
states within the euro zone. At its core, the SGP 
had a ceiling of public deficits to 3 % of GDP and 
additionally allowed a maximal debt level of 60% 
of GDP. Unfortunately, from the very start, the 
latter target was not strictly enforced, as it was 
stipulated that member economies with public 
debt above the 60% limit were to introduce         
adequate measures to move this indicator 
systematically towards the target limit in order to 
fulfill these criteria.  In other words, from the very 
beginning surveillance agencies were not serious 
in actually bringing down accumulated public debt 
to within the target range. National interests, 
reflected in national fiscal policies prevailed and 
as a result, the SGP had a much weaker impact 
than planned.  
 
Despite the political attention the SGP received, it 
turned out to be a toothless instrument, as it did 
not prevent irresponsible fiscal behaviour or   
sanction countries that flouted the pact. Many 
economies, for varying reasons, violated the 
public deficit target early on. Greece, Italy and 
Portugal were the biggest culprits. Even when 
using its own figures, Greece was systematically 
reporting above the ceiling figures for the whole 
period between 2000 and 2007; Italy did exactly 
the same; while Portugal was only slightly better 
off as it kept its public deficit    below the ceiling in 
2007. Germany had deficits above the target 
between 2002 and 2005; France violated the 
SGP in 2003 and 2004; Austria between 2004 
and 2006, and the Netherlands reported a 
violation in 2003.
1 The situation is even worse 
with regard to public debt. Countries like Greece, 
Italy, and Belgium entered the euro zone with 
higher debts than the SGP allowed, and never 
even came close to reduce their debt piles.  
                                                 
1 Figures from Eurostat 2011  (accessed 14 April 
2011) 
However, not all economies that belonged to the 
group of violators ended up in the   current group 
of potential debt default economies. Germany, for 
example, was violating the deficit target and 
achieved jointly with France, another violator, a 
reform of the SGP in 2005, which added a further 
discretionary clause to the SGP. This reform was 
supposed to avoid a situation where the 
excessive deficit procedure would eventually 
result in a fine, and thus not only further hurt 
German public finances but also put a dent into  
the country’s excellent credit reputation. Not only 
was Germany successful in reordering its public 
finances after 2006, not least due to   
improvements in economic growth, but it also 
added a strong dose of resilience to its regime of 
accumulation that resulted in impressive 
improvements of its SGP position.  
 
The German case shows that public finances are 
an integral part of the domestic economic-political 
regime and are handled in this domain and not in 
the domain provided by the SGP.  Public deficits 
or surpluses are the outcome of a range of 
variables, not least dependent on tax revenues 
that,  ceteris paribus, reflect the strength of 
economic growth. They also depend on 
institutional factors like the ability of states to 
collect taxes properly. Spain and Ireland, two 
other ‘deviant’ cases, handled their public 
finances, until the financial crisis of 2008, in 
excellent ways and not only kept their deficits   
below the 3% ceiling but even had years with 
budget surpluses. This changed dramatically with 
the financial crisis. Ireland had to come under the 
protective umbrella of the EU and Spain may 
soon follow. 
 
The good deficit figures for Spain and Ireland     
before the crisis should not be interpreted as the 
result of a well-functioning SGP. The probability is 
high that the records would have been identical if 
the SGP had not existed at all. In both cases, low 
deficit ratios reflected the dynamics of national EU Centre Policy Brief  3
 
 
regimes of accumulation. In Ireland, economic 
growth  was  driven  by  a  strong  dose  of              
financialisation that made Irish banks big players 
in financial markets, and at the same time kick-
started huge investments in real estate. Economic 
growth in Spain was driven by low real interest 
rates that were the result of the one-size-fits-all 
monetary policy by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) that generated its own real estate bubble. 
What both cases have in common though, is that 
the use of international liquidity was met by           
extremely  weak  regulations  on  the  side  of        
national  regulatory  agencies.  This  problem  was       
compounded by the fact that regulation of the   
financial sector at the European level does not 
exist at all - an element that those who fought for 
financial market liberalization in Europe did not 
even consider when they opened this Pandora’s 
Box. In other words, the eurozone-wide interest 
rate policy of the ECB, in combination with lax 
regulatory practices on the national level has     
resulted in a fragmented European regulatory 
system. This led to low real interest rates that in 
turn drove spending behavior, mainly in favour of 
real estate and construction sectors in those 
economies.  High GDP-growth rates ultimately 
kept public debt ratios low, and even generated 
budget surpluses for some years.  
 
It is often argued that the case of Greece                 
demonstrated how weak statistical surveillance by 
the EU made room for policy makers of all             
political shades to follow their generous spending 
behavior. The ongoing revisions on the side of the 
Socialist Greek government since 2009 underline 
the huge gaps in the statistical reporting system 
and the lack of quality data which the SGP had to 
rely on. Eurostat and national statistical offices 
already work hard to improve coherent and           
encompassing data collection. Emphasizing the 
fudging of economic data however, misses the 
point. Runaway public deficits occur even in 
economies with high statistical standards. In the 
case of Greece, the underlying domestic problem 
has  more  to  do  with  the  Greek  variant  of            
capitalism that has been described as a model 
“for  a  domestic  market  of  anti-competitive       
regulation, barriers to entry, relatively cheap       
labour and stable product demand”.
2 Adding to 
these features are the hallmarks of a weak tax 
state, underdeveloped social security provisions 
and rigid labor laws, resulting in a recipe for low 
international competitiveness.  
 
The reform of the SGP in 2005, pushed mainly by 
France and Germany, added some flexibility in 
allowing for special circumstances to be taken 
into account when assessing the deficit situation 
of member states. The changes opened the           
possibility for stricter anti-cyclical public finances 
but neither did they generate spending restraint in 
times of relatively high economic growth nor did 
they prepare the ground for the magnitude of           
deficit acceptance that came with the financial 
and economic crisis of 2008.  
 
The principal flaw in the SGP was its sole focus 
on monetary indicators without taking into           
consideration other factors and variables that 
drive economic growth. This holds in particular 
with regard to the ever widening gap of current 
accounts in the eurozone that reflect (i) divergent 
developments of international competitiveness 
and/or (ii) out-of-bounds developments of national 
financial regimes. In terms of international           
competitiveness, the speed of divergence in the 
eurozone increased over time and was not even 
seen  as  a  problem  by  its  institutions.            
Simultaneously,  private  sectors  in  some       
economies used the abundance of liquidity to 
                                                 
2 Kevin Featherstone. The Greek Sovereign Debt 
Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime, 
in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, No 2, 
pp. 193-217 (here p. 197). An excellent analysis of the 
European debt crisis is given by Erik Jones: 
Macroeconomic imbalances and sovereign debt 
markets; in: Kurt Hübner (ed): Europe, Canada and the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, pp. 
289-305, Routledge 2011. EU Centre Policy Brief  4
 
 
finance ever more risky investments and thus 
contributed to a strong increase in the private 
debt  levels.  When  the  situation  emerged  that        
private sector actors needed to deleverage and 
thus to retreat from contributing to economic 
growth, it was up to the public sector then to         
increase its stabilization measures and to accept 
rising public deficits. As a result public deficits 
ballooned.  
 
It was not only the SGP but the overall financial 
architecture of the eurozone was also ill prepared 
to deal with the economic shocks of 2008-2009. 
In 2009, only five out of the 27 member states of 
the EU could report public deficit ratios below 3%. 
Four out of the five countries with the low deficit 
ratios were not members of the eurozone. This 
loss of fiscal control reflects the high costs of   
rescuing financial institutions, revenue losses due 
to the absolute shrinking of national GDPs, and 
the costs of discretionary fiscal policy packages 
that were needed to contain the crisis. If we take 
into consideration that many eurozone economies 
entered the financial crisis with already high debt 
ratios, then we have a scenario of the perfect 
storm. 
 
 
II  The Political Economy of Rebuilding 
the Financial Architecture 
 
The dramatic deterioration of fiscal positions was 
put  in  the  limelight  when  George                      
Papakonstantinou, the Greece finance minister, 
announced on October 20, 2009, that the reports 
by the previous Conservative government on 
Greece’s  deficit  ratio  of  3.6%  had  been             
inaccurate and needed to be increased to 12.8 % 
(and this was then further increased to 13.6 %). 
The immediate spotlight then was on Greece, 
mainly due to the quick responses of rating         
agencies and the financial markets that asked for 
a strong increase in the risk premiums for Greek 
debt. The architecture of the eurozone was           
endangered, in particular due to the surprise         
factor  that  Greece  generated.  Neither  the         
eurozone institutions nor national governments 
were in any way prepared to deal with this             
challenge.  
 
Since then, “hectic” or even “chaotic” crisis       
management  on  the  side  of  the  EU  has           
dominated. Worst of all, the form and content of 
the  crisis  management  reflected  the  deeply      
entrenched inter-governmental character of the 
established mode of economic governance. 
 
That inter-governmentalism reigns and national 
interests dominate became obvious when the 
rescue package for Greece was discussed. The 
German centre-right coalition worked hard to       
delay any meaningful decision, mainly due to the 
fact that it feared negative repercussions from the 
electorate in the important political battleground of 
North-Rhine Westphalia. By focusing on domestic 
interests,  the  German  government  willingly      
accepted a further increase of the already high 
yield on 10-year and five-year Greek government 
debt, and thus invited financial markets to put   
further pressure on Greece. Only when the       
danger of contagion was mounting did Germany 
eventually give its support to the €110 billion     
rescue package, jointly provided and managed by 
the members of the eurozone (€80 billion,             
provided according to the respective paid-up   
capital shares in the ECB) and the rest coming 
from the IMF. The package was designed as a 
typical IMF stand-by program and accordingly 
came with tough conditionalities that need to be 
fulfilled in order to pay out the various credit 
tranches.  
 
The Greece program however, did not help to 
calm financial markets; on the contrary, risk       
premiums  for  Spain,  Ireland  and  Portugal         
continued to increase. Pressure from the financial 
markets  thus  triggered  the next response by the  
eurozone  members,  namely  the  launch  of  the   EU Centre Policy Brief  5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) which 
was supposed to raise up to €440 billion provided 
by member states of the eurozone, €60 billion of 
supranational funds (European Financial Stability 
Mechanism,  EFSM)  provided  by  the  European         
Commission, and up to €250 billion from the IMF. 
By introducing what seemed at the time an       
economic “Powell Doctrine” of shock and awe, 
the EU indeed injected new breath into the dire      
financial situation of Greece and the eurozone as 
a whole. The financial markets seemed to be 
temporarily satisfied with the financial rescue 
package  by  the  EU  and  the  launch  of  the         
European Financial Stability Mechanism as a 
whole, and pulled back on their endless pressure 
for a certain period of time.  
 
Then  along  came  Ireland.  Long  seen  as  a          
potential candidate to move under the umbrella of 
the  EFSF,  it  needed  the  disclosure  of  quickly           
accumulating real estate-related losses by Irish 
banks. The Irish government has come to the 
rescue of these banks, providing encompassing 
guarantees to their debts in 2008, leading to great 
stresses on government accounts.  However, the 
severe losses of the banks and the fear by other 
EU member states that any bankruptcy of these 
banks  would  have  severe  and  even                  
uncontrollable   repercussions  for  their  domestic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
banking systems led to pressures on Ireland to 
accept a €85 billion support program from the 
EU/IMF. From this sum, €67.5 billion would come 
from the EU/IMF and €17.5 billion from the               
reserve balances of the Irish treasury and the 
Irish National Pension Fund. More than two-thirds 
should go towards the public budget, with the rest 
being used to recapitalize the banking sector. 
Like in Greece, the rescue programs come with 
enforced  drastic  austerity  measures.  Those      
pro-cyclical policies drove economic  growth      
further into the abyss while political responses     
differed. In Greece social unrest dominated but 
was kept at bay by the government. The Irish 
response was a default that led to new elections 
(and a new government).  
 
The EFSF (temporary fund) that was launched in 
2010 would be terminated in mid-2013, and this 
provided the next concern. What exactly would 
happen if Greece and Ireland could not handle 
their affairs in time to return to “economic growth” 
by  2013?  And  what  would  be  the  political          
response on the side of the EU if Portugal and 
Spain needed to move under the umbrella of the 
EFSF?  Even before the Portuguese government, 
under  the  impression  of  a  political  crisis  in        
Portugal that led to the retreat of the government, 
decided to make use of the EFSF, the European 
Union had made its next move by establishing the 
Greece Package 
€ 80 bn eurozone members 
€ 30 IMF stand-by/conditionalities 
EFSM 
€60 bn 
EU member states 
AAA rating 
Conditional loans 
EU-IMF-ECB management 
Euribor+ 292.5 basis points 
Expiry 30 June 2013 
Council decision based on article 122 
TFEU 
EFSF 
€ 440 bn eurozone economies (without Greece) 
€ 250 bn IMF commitment 
Effective lending capacity € 440bn 
AAA rating based on loan guarantees of members 
Loans + bond purchases on primary bond market 
Strict conditionality 
EUC-IMF-ECB management 
Euribor +247 bps + EFSF costs 
Beneficiaries: eurozone economies 
Expiry 30 June 2013 
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European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as the 
permanent successor institution to the EFSF 
when it terminates in 2013. The ESM is flanked 
by a so-called Europe Plus Pact (EPP) pushed by 
France and Germany that is supposed to add a 
structure of mutual surveillance on a broad range 
of economic indicators, from current account to 
unit wage costs. The EPP is very much in the     
tradition of the EU’s open-method of coordination 
that relies on peer pressure and deliberate action, 
which  have  been  perceived  by  some  as            
ineffective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This brief summary shows that it was pressures 
from financial markets, particularly actions by       
rating agencies with their endless downgrading of 
European government bonds that drove the EU’s 
management  of  this  crisis.  Pro-active  crisis        
management cannot be observed, and thus it 
comes as no surprise that the debates about the 
coherence of the new financial architecture have 
not yet come to an end. Macroeconomic data 
from Greece indicate that the economy will not be 
in a position to access international capital           
markets as planned, by 2012. Still, the EU has 
not yet come forward with a plan for an orderly 
restructuring of Greek government bonds. This is 
troubling as the EU has added a further element 
of risk into the ‘debt game’ by adding so-called 
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) to the new 
ESM. Even though those CACs would only hold 
for new loans after 2013, this action signals to 
financial markets that they have to consider       
haircut losses for any new credits they will hand 
out when the new mechanism is in place. CACs 
are good economic policy if a clear-cut framework 
of debt restructuring accompanies them.  
 
The EU and even more so the ECB make it clear 
that haircuts are out of the discussion. The 
reason for this position is obvious, at least with 
regard to the ECB. The latter engaged heavily in 
providing   liquidity for debt-troubled economies 
by buying ‘bad’ bonds. Any haircut would have 
negative implications for the ECB’s balance 
sheet. The opposing view on the side of the EU 
has much to do with the opposition from its main 
member states which fear that haircuts would 
ultimately overstretch their own banking systems 
as significant amounts of troubled debts are held 
by their banks. Currently, the main players are 
trying to buy time until when the ESM can be 
used as the main debt crisis mechanism. Given 
the severe economic and political costs of the 
actions taken by national governments, it is 
questionable if this strategy will succeed.  
 
 
III  Will the Euro Survive? 
 
If  the  history  of  European  integration  and         
monetary cooperation in Europe can be used to 
speculate about the future, there would be no 
doubt that the euro will survive, and may even 
become  a  stronger  currency  than  before.          
European integration seems to rely on crises in 
order to move to the next level. The current             
existential crisis of the euro has already changed 
the institutional features of the eurozone in a way 
nobody would have dared to anticipate a year 
ago. The changes so far have been the outcome 
of dense negotiations between governments, with 
ESM 
Effective lending capacity €500 bn 
paid-in capital by EU member states +  callable 
capital + guarantees 
AAA rating 
Loans and bond purchase on primary market 
(exception) 
Strict conditionality 
EUC + IMF + ECB management 
Funding costs + 200 bps + 100 bps for amounts 
outstanding after 3 years 
Beneficiaries are eurozone economies 
Permanent mechanism 
Treaty of eurozone members in order to         
establish an intergovernmental institution EU Centre Policy Brief  7
 
 
the Commission taking a backseat.  If it seemed 
that the Lisbon Treaty has pushed the weight       
towards EU institutions, then the crisis seems to 
have  stopped  this  trend  and  national                  
governments are back in a big way in the whole 
crisis  management  process.  This  holds  in         
particular for the German government whose           
actions are very much determined by national 
preferences and the political limits set by the               
electorate and its highest Supreme Court.  
 
Some  observers  argued  that  without  further       
political integration the euro would be at risk.     
More political integration should not be 
confounded with building a federal Europe. The 
topic of a stronger European federal state has 
disappeared since the year 2000 when the 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer tried to 
argue in favour of it, and circumstances dictate 
that this discussion will not come back anytime 
soon.  As a matter of fact, the euro crisis has 
moved anti-European parties in many countries 
into the forefront, not only in Finland where the 
party of the ‘True Finns’ may even get into a 
position to block a ESFS-support program for 
Portugal.  
 
Keeping the euro on track comes with enormous 
economic and social costs in the debtor countries 
with high fiscal costs for the creditor countries, not 
least as it is uncertain whether credits will be 
served and paid back at a later point in time. 
However, the option of non-action comes with an 
even higher cost, as sovereign debt defaults will 
have,  among  others,  severe  negative                
repercussions for national banking sectors, which 
will be in strong need of public capital injections. 
Even though the debates about the costs and 
benefits  of  more  encompassing  structures,       
institutions and means of economic governance 
are not at its end, it seems clear that core             
countries of the EU have already invested too 
much economic and political capital to risk a 
breakdown of the eurozone. 
Deepening political integration can take various 
forms. In essence, it needs a domestication of the 
harsh forms of inter-governmentalism that the     
crisis brought to the forefront. Strengthening,     
redefining and creating truly European institutions 
are essential. This requires handing back the     
initiative as well as the responsibility for economic 
governance to the Commission and thus avoiding 
the trend towards inter-governmentalism that 
have been led by national interests. Small but 
decisive steps are asked for.  
 
The ESM offers an opportunity to move into the 
right direction. This new mechanism needs to put 
into a position an institutional framework for         
orderly debt restructuring of eurozone economies. 
This can be done with the right to buy back public 
debt in the primary markets (as a rule and not as 
an exemption) and by offering European versions 
of ‘Brady Bonds’ that allow private loan holders to 
exchange (for a discount) their bonds for secure 
and tradable euro bonds. Such an initiative would 
help to put an end to the on-going game of             
financial markets to increase the risk premiums 
for government bonds of the southern core in     
order to reap high margins. It would also provide 
the EU with a policy tool that allows for an               
alternative debt strategy that goes beyond the 
current traditional debt relief packages. Actorness 
of the Commission requires at least a modest   
independent  budget.  The  introduction  of  a        
financial transaction tax would generate sufficient 
funds to give the Commission financial clout and 
thus provide space for autonomous policy action. 
The haphazard reforms of the SGP need to be  
re-evaluated and modified in the direction of       
nationally diversified limits for public deficits and 
public debt that take into account the differences 
of public finances. Instead of following the strict 
rule-binding and one-size-fits-all approach 
currently in place, a case-sensitive policy is 
needed.  The ECB should  keep its independence EU Centre Policy Brief  8
 
 
in determining monetary policy, but has to   overcome its one-target-
only constitution.  
 
To make the euro and the eurozone sustainable requires first and  
foremost a drastic regime shift. Changes in the economic mode of     
governance have been made and more are under way. Those 
changes will ensure the survival of the euro though it is another       
story to make the euro sustainable and strong.  
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